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1 This text develops ideas that have been presented, in several occasions, and for example at the « conférence 
Jean Jacques Laffont » of the 2010 Congress of the l’Association Française de Science Economique, or at invited 
lectures,  (in the series «food for thought : on a post mortem of the financial crisis “  of the European Bank of 
Investment and in the Columbia conference, “Micro‐foundations for macroeconomics”). Related ideas have  
been presented and discussed in many seminars, workshops, in Marseille, Stanford, New Dehli, Bombay, Aix en 
Provence, Warwick…. I thank participants for their comments and suggestions, and in particular to K. Binmore, 
M. Cingolani, P. Sen. I am particularly grateful to Alan Kirman for his careful critical reading of a previous 
version, which contributed improving both English and content. I remain responsible for any shortcoming.   
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Résumé : La première partie de ce texte revient sur la vision économique standard de la 
coordination des anticipations, vision que les événements récents conduisent à remettre en 
cause. La seconde partie passe en revue les directions existantes de réflexion critique sur 
l’hypothèse d’anticipations rationnelles. La troisième partie montre comment l’évaluation 
critique de l’hypothèse, dans une logique parfois qualifiée de « divinatoire », change 
radicalement notre regard sur trois problèmes : le rôle économique de la spéculation, 
l’efficacité informationnelle des marchés, et last but not least, la capacité des agents à horizon 
long à anticiper l’avenir. La quatrième partie souligne les acquis et les défis de la réflexion   
 
 
Abstract : The first part of this text reviews the standard economic viewpoint on 
expectational coordination, a viewpoint that the recent events have challenged. The second 
part reviews different existing directions assessments of the rational expectations hypothesis 
that have been made to-date. The third part shows how such a critical assessment, along the 
lines of the so-called “eductive” learning approach, radically modifies our view of three key 
problems : the economic role of speculation, the informational efficiency of markets and, last 
but not least, the ability of agents with long horizon to anticipate the future.  The fourth part 
stresses what has been achieved so far well as the future challenges of the approaches 
advocated in this paper. 
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Introduction.  
The question of the stability of a market system has been a recurrent subject of debate 
since the beginning of the 19th century, (which is usually viewed as the starting point of 
economics as a field). “L’offre crée sa propre demande » (« supply creates its own demand »): 
this formula, a remarkable digest of the argument, is supposed to capture the essence of Jean 
Baptiste Say’s analysis (1803). It expresses the basis of the strong confidence of some of the 
early protagonists of the debate in the “systemic stability” of markets.  But others strongly 
disagreed: Jean Baptiste Sismondi, and the « catastrophist » school, and its most famous 
adept, Karl Marx, were waiting for crisis and possibly the “final crisis” of the capitalist 
system. In the middle, Léon Walras thought that the argument provided by Say was 
unconvincing, but developed an alternative analysis that has been viewed for long as 
supporting rather than dismissing the optimistic conclusion. The skepticism about the 
« systemic stability » of the market has reappeared after the 1929 crisis and Keynes forcefully 
argued for Government intervention to fight markets’ instability.  
At the beginning of the present millennium, the mainstream economic theory had 
apparently rallied Say’s optimism. Even if markets may not be fully self regulatory, our 
knowledge had improved so that, according to Robert Lucas, the « central problem of 
depression prevention has been solved ». Was not the « great moderation », as suggested by 
Ben Bernanke’s argument, a proof of the adequacy and efficiency of the present 
macroeconomic and monetary policies?  But the argument reflected an appraisal of the facts 
that was intellectually and geographically biased (see Reinhardt-Rogoff (2008))…. Facts, 
such as crises, bubbles, are stubborn, and their stubbornness challenges the system of 
explanations that became predominant in economics. We have to admit: neither the volatility 
of financial markets, nor the logic of a crisis time are satisfactorily assessed in the best of our 
present models.  
Many economists, though not all, would agree that the recent crisis has raised 
questions about the present state of economic theory; a subset would probably agree that the 
reading of the events through the standard lenses of the dominant theories signals some kind 
of an “economic theory failure”. Going somewhat further, I belong to the circle of those who 
believe that economic theory has a central responsibility for the occurrence of the financial 
crisis, which triggered the recent economic events. The bottom line is that economists have 
provided a too optimistic view of the working of the financial markets, (the repeated emphasis 
put by many specialists on the « efficient market hypothesis » is a most spectacular 
illustration of this bias). Such an over-optimistic view has within a group - the practitioners of 
the financial sector, already prone to self satisfaction and reluctant to regulation - triggered the 
deployment of uncontrolled imagination. The previous acceptance of exaggeratedly optimistic   
conclusions, either in finance or macroeconomics, has reflected an   uncritical acceptance of 
modelling principles, which were incorrectly given the status of unquestionable axioms.  The 
question of what went wrong with standard economic theory in general and with its modelling 
principles in particular, is however likely to suggest a variety of answers. Let me sketch three 
of them.  
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1- The first one does not refer so much to modelling principles but rather to the 
diversification of modelling, There has been a multiplication of fronts in modern economic 
research, but the inside progress on each of the fronts is probably less and less understood 
from outside, even from neighbouring subfields. I have argued elsewhere that the 
balkanisation of knowledge is more of a problem in an economic (or social science) context, 
where social action must rely on all dimensions of understanding, than in a scientific field like 
physics, where applications depend a lot on specifics. From my teaching experience, I have 
been struck with the fact that, within the field of finance, the communication between, let us 
say, the subfields of standard asset pricing, mathematical finance, “informational” finance, 
corporate finance, the econometrics of finance, etc…was most limited.  The difficulty of a 
getting a synthetical view of the different fronts is however exacerbated when the question of 
systemic stability, not only of the financial system, but also of the economy as a whole, comes 
on the scene. Let me stop elaborating on the idea I have just outlined, not because it is 
uninteresting, but because it takes us away from my main purpose here.  
2- A second line of criticism concerns the rationality hypothesis, which has been a 
quasi-obliged ingredient of economic analysis in the past. Real economic agents do not have 
the supposed rationality of homo-economicus: Paul Krugman has made this point forcefully, 
for example in his New York Times chronicles. In fact, the rapid development of behavioural 
economics in the last twenty years has stressed the limits of the standard concepts of 
rationality: behaviour under uncertainty, time consistency, symmetric treatment of losses and 
gains, to quote a few research themes, have been the subject of critical reconsideration. Hence 
the criticism just evoked would point not so much to a failure to analyse the limits of standard 
rationality, but rather to a failure to focus on the consequences of this reconsideration, let us 
say in finance and macroeconomics2. 
3- The “failure of economic theory” stressed in the present paper, which in my opinion 
is central, concerns expectational coordination. The oscillations of the assessment of 
expectational coordination in our models reflects major hesitations: either, as in most of the 
past before the 50’s, expectations are modelled as exogenous, (this is the viewpoint taken 
until recently in the temporary equilibrium approach to dynamics), or from the mid 60’s they 
have become more and more “right on average”, this is the essence of the rational 
expectations hypothesis, which is the main subject of discussion here. The first option, taking 
expectations as given, can be, at best, a preliminary step in a more complex analysis and 
markets expectations have to be explained and not taken as exogenous data. But the ability of 
decentralised systems such as markets to produce “good” coordination3, good in the sense of 
 
2 With noticeable exceptions such as Bolton‐Scheinkman‐Wiong (2006) 
3 There are different senses in which rational expectations are “good”: first, agents are right on average and 
hence make decisions that are individually optimal, second, the social outcome is satisfactory, since for 
example, the “equilibrium of plans prices and price expectations” stressed in next section is Pareto optimal. In 
general, although “rational expectations” might not be second best optimal expectations, the failure of the 
rational expectations hypothesis signals an “expectational coordination failure” and in a sense, a market failure 
in the usual sense of the word (see however section 4, for a brief discussion of such a market failure).  
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the rational expectations hypothesis, has also to be explained. And it may or may not be 
possible to produce reasonable explanations. In the latter case, one has to conclude that 
markets are likely to fail to coordinate expectations in a satisfactory way, (satisfactory in the 
sense of the rational expectations hypothesis, but also, in many other senses of the word). As 
argued in the previous footnote, we are then faced with a potential “expectational 
coordination failure”, the analysis of which is the subject of the present paper.  
The first part of the paper returns very briefly to the post second world war history of 
economic thought. It recalls the rise of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis in the field of 
formalized economic theory.  
The second part reviews the attempts at a critical assessment of the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis that have developed particularly since the beginning of the eighties.  
The third part of the paper will illustrate how a critical approach, and in particular the 
one associated with my own research, may trigger a drastic change in the understanding of 
problems, and in particular in the evaluation of economic policies. I will stress three 
examples, i.e. the economic role of speculation, the so-called informational efficiency of 
markets, and the ability agents with long horizon to predict the future.  
The fourth part will conclude by coming back briefly on the presented analysis and 
stressing the future challenges.  
1- The rise of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis in modern 
theory.  
The rational expectations hypothesis, from now REH, says that economic agents have 
a view of the future which is “basically right”: this view may vary depending on individual 
information but it is not biased. Stressing that the hypothesis is distinct from the individual 
rationality hypothesis, is obvious but still worthwhile. The idea that “the rational expectations 
hypothesis is nothing else than an extension of the rationality hypothesis to expectations” has 
been a misleading but (unfortunately) extremely popular argument for the REH. In fact, let us 
say in a large economy4, it is “right” (individually rational) to adopt the REH, but only if the 
other agents adopt it. It is wrong in the other case. To put it in a game-theoretical vocabulary, 
the rational expectations equilibrium is a “Nash equilibrium”, not “a dominant strategy” 
equilibrium.   
The rise of the debate on expectations in economic theory can be dated from the fifties 
and the sixties. Although the pioneering article (Muth (1962)) deals with a microeconomic 
subject, the macroeconomic polemics triggered by some so-called Keynesian policies is 
behind the scene: agents can be fooled once, twice, (implicitly by the Government) but not 
                                                            
4 I refer, for example, to the continuum of agents’ framework which serves as a basis to the analysis of 
Guesnerie‐Jara‐Moroni (2011) 
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forever: they will refer, or one has to model them as if, to the “relevant economic theory”.  
The Relevant Economic Theory Hypothesis will become the Rational Expectations 
Hypothesis (REH), a more appealing label, (although misleading as I have argued). Then 
progressively, the REH will take over theoretical modelling, or if one prefers “formalized 
economic theory”.  
Let me illustrate such a rise. Start with the field of general equilibrium, which put 
emphasis on a formally static model, (Debreu (1959) supporting however an a-temporal 
implementation of inter-temporal equilibrium. In a truly inter-temporal framework, the 
economy consists of a succession of spot markets for goods and financial markets at each 
period, (replacing the futures markets held at the beginning of time of the static theory). The 
equilibrium becomes an “equilibrium of plans, prices and price expectations” (Radner 
(1972)), an equilibrium which may be interpreted either as involving perfect foresight or, in 
the broader sense stressed here, rational expectations. In this general framework, if markets 
are “essentially complete”, the outcome is efficient and replicates the complete markets 
solution of the static model (see Arrow (1953), Guesnerie-Jaffray (1974)). In this setting, 
“incompleteness” or the “inadequacy of price expectations” are sources of “markets failures”.  
Also, since Walras, economists are aware that the market, in order to deliver the prices that 
are solutions of the equilibrium equations, has to be a substitute of a computing machine. 
According to Walras, the virtues of the market computing algorithm are not obvious and have 
to be explained (this is the purpose of the tâtonnement theory). In the inter-temporal context, 
the “equilibrium of plans, prices and price expectations” possibly hides two deus ex machina: 
spot markets at a given date clear, (this is one of the algorithmic virtues of the market, which 
normally is subject to verification), but this process relies on an understanding of the next 
period spot markets clearing, the equations of which are implicitly supposed to be resolved in 
people’s minds.   Hence, part of the market “equilibrations” in the sense of F. Perroux, can be 
viewed as the product of a kind of collective thinking of the agents. Such a collective thought 
process helps to resolve the walrasian auctioneer’s problem, the mental activity of the agents 
mimicking the working of the to-morrow’s market algorithm.  
General equilibrium provides a good reference of the general movement. Most inter-
temporal modelling in most specialized fields, either with a general equilibrium flavour, as 
trade, or with a partial equilibrium focus, (labour markets, insurance,..) will routinely adopt 
the rational expectations hypothesis.  
Modern finance is partially rooted in general equilibrium, and the REH has a clear hegemonic 
position in the field and underlies its influential theoretical models, for example those which 
stress the informational efficiency of markets, even in its most critical versions (Grossman-
Stiglitz (1980)).  
Last but not least, the REH has acquired a hegemonic position in modern 
macroeconomics. Lucas’ dismissal of voluntarist policies takes place in a rational 
expectations world (Lucas (1972)).  The Real Business Cycles models (from now on RBC) 
sometimes presented as “walrasian”, describe long-lived (identical) agents who anticipate the 
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whole future, correctly in the sense of the REH. In this world, there are few spot markets 
adjustments and most adjustments come from expectations and agents are as good as the best 
theorist at computing the complex equilibrium. New Keynesian models although their 
denomination refers to Keynes, echo some of the Walras preoccupations concerning the 
implementation of the equilibrium. Prices are quoted, not tentatively by the auctioneer, but 
irrevocably within each round of quotation, by firms having some market power. The 
procedure introduces frictions, which indeed have a Keynesian flavour, but the quotation of 
prices, which provides a non-walrasian response to the Walras problem, relies on the REH: 
firms have a correct understanding of the future, in particular of the future flows of quotations 
by rival firms. “Good” expectational coordination is also taken for granted5.    
2- Directions for a critical assessment.  
If the REH has gained a hegemonic position in formalized economic theory, 
paralleling the rise of Nash Equilibrium in game theory, it has not been unchallenged. I will 
review three directions for a critical assessment.  
1- In economic theory as well as in game theory, there is an “internal” challenge 
(internal in the sense that it appears even if you find the assumption methodologically 
impeccable), a multiplicity challenge. In a game setting, the question takes the form: what   
happens if there are several Nash equilibria ? Rephrased in Muth’s defence of the REH, this 
says: “what is the relevant economic theory when there are several candidates”?  
In economic models, the multiplicity question is particularly acute in infinite horizon 
models : take for example the simplest model of this sort, a one-dimensional, one step forward 
looking model, where the state, at time t, obtains as a function of the expectation of the state 
at time t+1. Typically, such a model has at least a steady state (x* such that x*=f(x*)), but 
also a continuum of perfect foresight equilibria), which may, or may not, remain close to the 
steady state (in the former case, the steady state is referred to be  “indeterminate”, in the latter, 
it is said to be “determinate”). Also, it has been understood, that besides the “focal solution”, 
(the perfect foresight steady state equilibrium), there could also exist well behaved 
(stationary) stochastic rational expectations equilibria:  indeed, the stochastic stationary 
beliefs governing “sunspot equilibria” look arbitrary but are self-fulfilling (see (Azariadis 
(1981), Azariadis-Guesnerie (1982, 1986), Farmer-Woodford (1984), and for a broader 
approach and an attempt at synthesis, Chiappori-Guesnerie (1990), and Guesnerie-Woodford 
(1992)). The lessons drawn from the sunspot literature are fairly general. For example, in a 
slightly more complicated framework than the one just introduced, one-dimensional, memory 
one, one step forward looking models, the focal solution switches to a “saddle path” 
                                                            
5 Modern macroeconomic theory, does not rule out however a critical assessment of the REH. For example, the 
Taylor rule leads to choosing a monetary policy which triggers a “determinate” equilibrium, a requirement that 
reflects suspicions about other inter-temporal solutions, although they also meet the REH (see next section).  
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trajectory, although the logic of multiplicity (of sunspot or non-sunspot type) remains the 
same so that the investigation triggers analogous results. Adding complexity (see Evans-
Guesnerie (2005)) and/or intrinsic noise does not change the flavour of the analysis.  
Another line of research falls under the heading of a critical assessment of the REH :  
it is the line associated with the global games literature initiated in the work of Carlsson Van- 
Damme (1993) and Morris-Shin (1998), (2003). It puts emphasis on the incompleteness of the 
information held by the agents. The initial message (Morris-Shin (1998)) is somewhat 
different from, and to some extent opposed to, the message of the sunspot literature. The 
simple theory of currency attack suggests the existence of multiple equilibria, when a better 
modelling of the noisy information used by the agents often lead to the restoration of  
uniqueness.6 Taking into account the incomplete information faced by the agents is a key, 
even the key, ingredient of the global games analysis.   
Another line of critical assessment of the REH which is again internal (it accepts the 
Hypothesis, but puts the emphasis on internal difficulties) is the « herd behaviour” literature. 
With herd behaviour, the RE equilibrium exists, but the outcome depends on details of the 
starting conditions and is fragile in the sense that the information transmitted may be 
unreliable (see Banerjee (1992), Chamley (2002)). 7 
2- Let me now evoke lines of criticisms that imply a more basic reconsideration of the 
REH. I refer to them as “external criticisms”. I will start from approaches that may be given a 
more fundamentalist tone, from those that are of more informal or eclectic inspiration.  
It is natural to interpret Muth’s « relevant economic theory” as, in game theoretical 
terms, a Common Knowledge “theory”8. The REE is then known to everybody, and 
everybody knows that everybody knows it etc…The natural, somewhat fundamental, question 
to be raised is the following: is it the case that Common Knowledge of the world (the logic of 
interactions) and Common Knowledge of Rationality (the logic of decision) imply Common 
Knowledge of the equilibrium? If the answer is yes, then there is a sense in which there is a 
Common Knowledge (from now on CK) relevant economic theory. In my terminology, 
(Guesnerie (1992), (2005)), the equilibrium is “strongly rational” and globally “eductively 
stable” (“eductively” because the assumptions trigger a collective “learning” process that 
takes place in people’s minds). In a simple variant of Muth’s original model, (Guesnerie 
(1992), the answer to the question may be positive or negative depending on the 
characteristics of supply and demand. Interestingly, the answer is closely connected to the 
                                                            
6 Furthermore, this unique equilibrium is « eductively” stable in the sense suggested below.  
7  Part of the literature keeps the REH but put the emphasis on the imperfect awareness of the state of the 
economy by agents. Such imperfect information may occur even when all information is publicly available and 
agents have limited attention.  see Sims (2011), Reis (2006) Woodford (2009)  
8 See Phelps (2007), on “Equilibrium theory…..This in turn implies that everyone knows this understanding to 
be common knowledge..”, (foreword to Frydman-Goldberg (2007) p14.  
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convergence of the old fashioned Cobweb tâtonnement (a real time process that the collective 
virtual time thought process just alluded to above mimics). As global “eductive” stability 
along the lines of argument sketched here is very demanding, it makes sense generally to 
define local “eductive” stability.This line of investigation has numerous applications, a subset 
of which is reported in my book Guesnerie (2005)).  
The line of research of M. Kurz and his co-authors can also be interpreted as a 
departure from the Muth implicit assumptions of CK. In Muth, the exogenous processes 
generating intrinsic uncertainty have to be Common Knowledge. Giving up this assumption 
involves drastic changes in the dynamics of coordination, which involves the so-called 
rational beliefs (or diverse beliefs) see Kurz (1994), Kurz-Motolese (2011), which are not 
REH beliefs. More generally, the assumption of a common prior is dubious, a fact that 
suggest bridges between the rationality criticism and the rational expectations criticism.  
3- The next line of inquiry is the one associated with the old line of research on real 
time learning: here agents predict the future using inferences that rely on the past. As time 
passes, they adapt their forecasts, up to the point where eventually learning is successful in the 
sense that forecasts and realisations become in line (for a review of such a line of research 
with applications specially to macroeconomics, see Evans-Honkappohja (2001)). As the 
“eductive” learning approach, the “evolutive” learning may be viewed as providing a 
robustness test for a given REE : the test is successful when the learning process converges, 
unsuccessful when it does not. As the “eductive” approach, the test is only apparently 0-1: in 
fact “eductive” as well “evolutive” learning may be slow or fast, a fact that affects the 
plausibility of the equilibrium.  
There are numerous connections between “eductive” and “evolutive” learning. Existing 
studies show that success or failure of “eductive” or “evolutive” learning are affected by the 
same parameters describing the situation (the connections are particularly interesting and 
spectacular in the infinite horizon models that have been introduced above, see Evans-
Guesnerie(2003), Gauthier-Guesnerie (2005)). And it has been argued that “eductive” 
learning may be justified as a kind of shortcut to “evolutive” learning (Guesnerie (2005)).  
This brief and subjective report shows that attempts at a critical assessment of the 
REH have been numerous, and have proceeded from different viewpoints. Do they have 
modified our views on the problems under consideration and for example on related economic 
policy questions?  
I will argue in the next section that they have, or at least that they should have, if the 
profession had taken enough attention to the messages that have been conveyed.  
3-How a critical assessment of the REH in different contexts 
change the standard (REH based) economic intuition.  
I will take three examples that are related, although not exclusively, to the “eductive” 
learning viewpoint and to my own research. The first one is concerned with the question of 
  
10
the value of new financial instruments or the stabilizing virtues of speculation, the second one 
with the informational efficiency of the market. Both issues raise key questions in finance. 
The third example reconsiders the “good” expectational coordination that RBC like models 
assume and argues that a critical assessment of the assumption suggests that it has very weak 
foundations: indeed, there are convincing arguments suggesting that in the considered context, 
expectational coordination is likely to be “bad”.  
1- New Financial Instruments: Guesnerie-Rochet (1993) have developed a simple 
inventory model with two goods and no production which is however, by some aspects, 
reminiscent of the Muth model. The initial organisation of the economy rests on the existence 
of storage capacities allowing, through costly actions, the transfer of part of the crop from a 
period of abundant crop to the next one. One then considers opening a futures market for the 
storable good, allowing people who are unable to store to participate. In both settings, the 
REH leads to a unique equilibrium. In a sense, the REE associated with the futures market is 
better: thanks to increased possibilities of insurance, the variance of the crop price is 
decreased. This reflects, in the model considered, an argument made by Friedman and which 
has indeed some generality: speculation is stabilizing (Friedman’s informal argument is that 
speculators sell when the price is high and buy when it is low). The point we make is however 
that the expectational robustness or plausibility of the REH in both cases, as evaluated from 
the “eductive stability” viewpoint9, decreases when the futures market opens. In other words, 
the set of parameters of the model for which the REE is stable shrinks when the futures 
market is introduced. Then, speculation is destabilizing, in a different but legitimate sense, i.e 
in the sense that it makes the RE coordination less plausible. Naturally, the specific 
(parameter related) stability conclusions drawn are debatable. However, the model neatly 
stresses one important insight: the effect, on the quality of expectational coordination, of 
opening new markets should be a key issue in the discussion of their usefulness.  
The same idea was illustrated recently in a different context, based on what I called 
“evolutive” learning.  Brock, Hommes and Wagener (2009) consider a model where the 
exchange of stocks at time t is based on the anticipation of the price at time t+1.  This 
anticipation is formed from a set of learning strategies, strategies whose distribution among 
players depends on their past success history.  The authors consider two versions of the 
conditions of exchange.  In the first version, the stock market is backed by no other market in 
the second case, claims contingent to a number of states of nature that determine the dividend 
stock, can be traded. Their number is however insufficient numbers for “completing” the 
markets. The robustness of the rational expectations equilibrium will be here validated by the 
convergence of the learning process toward equilibrium, the equilibrium which refers to 
fundamental values.  And convergence properties are summarized by thresholds in the 
parameters space that determine the bifurcations of dynamical system generated by learning.  
The conclusions of the article echo that of Guesnerie-Rochet: new markets, desirable from the 
                                                            
9 The same would likely to be true with stability criteria based on « evolutive learning », as suggested in the next 
subsection.     
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standpoint of risk spreading, have a destabilizing effect (i.e a dramatic negative effect on the 
convergence of learning).  
Why would such analyses, although admittedly special, would not have policy 
implications? At the least, they suggest that instead of accepting new financial products they 
do not understand, regulators should put the burden of the proof (the fact that, in particular, 
that they will not destabilize market expectations) on those who want to introduce new 
financial products. Note also, that the above studies suggest that the present working of the 
markets for primary goods and the role played by speculation raises questions in answer to 
which the standard REH analysis is likely to provide dubious recommendations.  
2- Prices and the transmission of information: The fact that markets are 
“informationally efficient”, the efficient market hypothesis, has been given different meanings 
in the literature. Let me discuss it from the classical work of Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) who 
propose a very moderate version of the property.  I will argue that the critical assessment of 
the REH permitted by the approach presented above shows that Grossman-Stiglitz’s 
conclusions still provide a too optimistic view of the ability of markets to transmit 
information. In their model, agents receive a private signal about the value of an asset, the 
average private signals providing a summary statistic of the total information available.  
Agents send a demand curve to the market organizer.  The latter aggregates these individual 
curves and deduce, given the random and unexplained supply of "noise traders", an 
equilibrium price that clears the transaction requests.  In a RE (Nash-Bayesian) Equilibrium, 
agents combine their own information with the information they optimally extract from the 
price, which reflects the others’ information. Indeed, in this setting, the market sends a 
"substantial" part of the total information of the society.  
Is however expectational coordination robust or fragile, for example with regard to the 
criteria of “eductive” stability presented above? The answer given by Desgranges (2000), 
Desgranges-Heinemann (2005), is simple and clear.  The equilibrium is “expectationally” 
stable, or strongly rational, in my terminology, only if it does not transmit too much 
information, too much being assessed against the individual information.  The intuition 
behind the intellectual logic of “eductive” coordination is easily explained: if the market 
provides too much information, the actions of agents, which have therefore a strong 
confidence in the market, hardly reflects their personal information.  But the market 
information is simply the sum of the information individually transmitted and will not be 
reliable if the agents transmit it sparingly: trusting the market too much leads you to dismiss 
your individual information and if everybody does that, the market will receive little 
information. There is a contradiction between the incentives to transmit information and the 
confidence that it arouses!  
This message was echoed in other contributions on this subject in a different frame 
(Desgranges-Geoffard-Guesnerie (2003)) or on related subjects (Ben-Porath Heifetz (2006)).   
Desgranges, Geoffard and Guesnerie (2003) have considered another model used in the 
literature of the 70’s and the 80’s on the role of prices in the transmission of information. In 
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this setting, there is a unique REH equilibrium. Again, the aggressive search of information 
can kill “eductive” stability. In other terms and again, one cannot trust the market too much if 
everybody else trusts it too much. 
 This goes beyond the result of Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) that the strong form of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis is impossible, because if markets were efficient in the sense that 
prices convey all present and future information nobody would invest resources in acquiring 
information. Such a weak form of the Hypothesis compatible with Grossman- Stiglitz’s views 
is still too much optimistic.  
One or two more points should be emphasized:  
- The set of possible outcomes of the interaction that can be “rationalized”10 when the rational 
expectations equilibrium ceases to be (locally) stable, can be identified in the Grossman-
Stiglitz framework. This set (a substitute for the set of equilibria)  does not consist any longer 
of a single point or of locally isolated points, but it is "thick": it follows that  the quality of 
information that agents can infer from its knowledge, is, in a sense, very poor.  Yet in the 
context thus outlined, agents cannot, in any clear sense, "beat the market."  The analysis 
suggests that the retreat of the most notorious supporters of the informational efficiency 
towards the position: "informational efficiency holds because agents cannot beat the market" 
is a real rout. 
- In this setting, let us just mention two more points. First, the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox, i.e 
that agents are not willing to pay for information, (because it will be provided freely by the 
market) partly disappears. In parallel, the risk premium required for market participation is 
much higher than the one associated with the REE.  
In terms of policy implications, these results shed doubt on the unquestioned faith of many in 
the preeminence of market prices of assets and liabilities in accounting and regulation.  
 
3- Long lived agents and the prediction of the future. The design of Real business 
cycles models is unlikely to support any Keynesian-like message: long-lived agents can 
transfer their inter-temporal wealth, without any constraints other than those relating to 
market conditions. Short run income has little effect on permanent income, so that the 
Keynesian multiplier can, at best, be very modest.  If one adds the icing on the cake that the 
agents rationally anticipate that additional taxes will be raised tomorrow to offset the deficit 
today, the Keynesian stimulus can be stored into oblivion!  The modelling options, long 
horizon, rational expectations, (leaving to one side the criticism bearing on the high 
aggregation level and possibly on price flexibility), rule out a Keynesian therapy.  Keynes 
goes out through the door.  In this context however, the neo-Keynesian models introduced an 
interesting innovation: firms announce prices for their products so that price adjustments are 
                                                            
10 In the game‐theoretical sense alluded to above.  
  
13
no longer the product of the deus ex machina of the market, (as I said earlier, indirect homage 
to Walras, even if the solution adopted does not rest on a process of trial and error).  As noted 
above, such models inherit some Keynesian-like properties: activity is variable across periods, 
with correspondingly alternation of inflationary or deflationary effects, that can be associated 
with a "Phillips curve".  Keynes is back on the stage.  But here, as in RBC models, agents 
have long horizons that allow them to re-allocate their intertemporal wealth as they wish, and 
they also have rational expectations. So firms announce prices, which is reasonable, but their 
decision is based on a statistically accurate view of future decisions of their competitors. So, 
the central question addressed here is back on the agenda: what can we say about the quality 
of coordination of expectations in all the models just evoked? 
I will advertise here for a text only available in the form of "discussion paper", co-
authored with G.  Evans and B.  Mc Gough (2010).  In this paper, we consider a RBC model, 
the simplest possible, i.e. deterministic, and we examine the steady state, characterized by a 
level of capital which is stable over time.  Under what conditions, is the equilibrium (locally) 
strongly rational or “eductively” stable in the sense described above? The surprising answer is 
never : in this model, viewed with the glasses advocated here, the infinite horizon equilibrium 
has maximum fragility. 
Let us indeed consider a neighbourhood of the inter-temporal equilibrium : it must be 
here a neighbourhood of the entire trajectory, say, for a simple example, a “tubular” 
neighbourhood: everyone believes that the capital will remain indefinitely in an epsilon 
neighbourhood  of its equilibrium value.  If all agents share such a belief (that the system will 
remain in the tubular neighbourhood), then their individual plans are constrained, and the 
same is true, by summation, of the corresponding states of the system.  For example, the 
hypothetical initial belief implies that capital will remain the first period, at least for certain 
values of parameters, inside the tube (we call this property “weak stability”).  The initial 
belief also puts bounds on the path of planned savings at each time by each agent, and thus on 
the capital stock that would result in each period.  But here is the key to the difficulty: within 
the bounds set by the beliefs, inter-temporal aggregate plans can deviate as much as you want 
from the tubular neighbourhood initially considered, and this holds true whatever the 
parameters of the system.  The reason is interesting: agents' decisions, either plans or 
immediate decisions are sensitive to the expectations of interest rates not only in the short run 
but also in the long run.  It follows that the long-term plans become increasingly sensitive to 
the forecast of interest rates over the entire trajectory and the more sensitive, the more distant 
is the period under consideration.  The fact that the long-term plans of the agents are strongly 
affected by the initial uncertainty implies that the mental process of elimination of dominated 
strategies is blocked at the first iteration: the hypothetical common belief of the first stage can 
not generate the common knowledge of equilibrium; the equilibrium is necessarily 
“eductively” unstable!   
This “high tech” story has “low tech” counterparts: beliefs in line with the initial tubular 
restriction will eventually lead the system to leave the “tube”, and the same is true if beliefs 
are adapted in conformity with standard learning rules. . Without going into the details of the 
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analysis, which later combines an “evolutive” dimension of learning together with an a priori 
tubular or non-tubular restriction, let us suggest that the analysis brings Keynes back on to the 
stage: in this world a key role for government expenditures is to improve expectational 
coordination. But the policy discussion would be premature and clearly goes beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
4- Conclusion on where to go ?   
Let me try first to summarize some of the lessons to be learnt from the previous 
investigation.  
First, the proponents of the REH tend to view it as a modelling axiom, which is 
equally reasonable across problems and situations. The point made here suggests on the 
contrary that the idea that the REH is an equally reasonable modelling option across 
situations is manifestly unbelievable. Should we, as some do suggest, conclude that the REH 
is uniformly unreasonable and uninteresting?  
One cannot seriously claim that it is uninteresting: for every problem, the REH provides a 
reference description of economic evolution, free of serious expectational mistakes. Its lack of 
compatibility with observed facts, whenever it occurs, is the source of an intellectual 
challenge.  
Is it uniformly unreasonable? I do not personally think so: there are problems and situations, 
(situations being characterized by the values of the relevant parameters for the considered 
problem) for which the REH provides a reasonable description of what may happen. Also 
quiet times, where the hypothesis provides a reasonable modelling tool, may alternate with 
turbulent times, where it is no longer the case.  
A critical view of the REH does not necessarily mean uniform and complete dismissal. 
But, as the preceding section makes clear, a critical view of the REH makes a huge difference 
in the policy discussion. When the REH holds, a policy change does not affect the quality of 
expectational coordination: the system goes from one REE to another one11. The argument 
made here, that policy changes affect the quality of expectational coordination, changes our 
perspective. It suggests that the evaluation of the change of quality of expectational 
coordination associated with a policy change is an unavoidable and potentially major 
dimension of any policy change.  
Going beyond the present argument, let us return to the different research strategies for 
facing the challenge of producing theories that truly face the difficulty of explaining, 
throughout situations, the quality of  expectational coordination, or the extent of expectational 
mis-coordination.  
                                                            
11 The multiplicity issue raises expectational coordination considerations, relating with equilibrium selection, and 
which are policy relevant, and which have been given attention in part of the present literature. 
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A first strategy aims at checking the robustness of the REH in a given context. The 
conclusion, which we may arrive at, is that, in a given situation, the REE coordination is a 
priori robust. This is the point of view taken in part of the research presented here, which was 
labelled “eductive” and has two possible directions of application. The global “eductive” test 
relies on the “high tech” analysis of a sophisticated mental process and is very demanding. 
The local “eductive” test, which, in a sense is the local version of the global hyper-
rationalistic criterion, has a “low tech” interpretation12: local “eductive stability basically 
reflects the elasticity of realizations to expectations: a small elasticity signals robustness when 
a high elasticity signals fragility. The standard learning studies can be given similar 
interpretations; convergence of the learning processes signals the plausibility of coordination, 
whereas absence of convergence signals difficulties. In both cases, the “eductive” approach 
and the standard “evolutive” one, the test is in principle 0-1 one, but in both cases, as already 
stressed, another less radical interpretation is available (since, for example convergence may 
be fast or slow).  
A more demanding, although attractive strategy is to search for a general alternative to  
REH modelling. Pursuing this approach does not necessarily mean a rejection of the just 
“robustness” line of investigation just sketched : the alternative might be close to the REH in 
cases where the REH construct produces robust outcomes, But this line is clearly much more 
ambitious: the objective is to stress outcomes which are not REE, but are, in a sense, 
“generalized economic equilibria13.   
Note first that the “eductive” approach, presented here, provides the basis for such an 
alternative theory, where the “generalized economic equilibria” would be identified with the 
“set of rationalizable equilibria”. Indeed, in some cases, they have been identified14 and 
provide an alternative view of plausible economic outcomes. Other alternatives have been 
proposed in the literature, such as the “diverse beliefs” equilibria of Kurz (1994) or the 
“imperfect knowledge economy” (IKE) of Frydman-Goldberg (2011), that I cannot discuss in 
depth here15.  
Let me however stress that the task is formidable. Out of the disciplined world of the 
REH, there is a “wilderness” of non-REH worlds, (if I may borrow from Sims’ metaphor of 
the “wilderness of bounded rationality”). Let me finally stress four reasons for such a 
wilderness. 
                                                            
12 For example, it does not suppose, in its less sophisticated interpretation, even that agents “know the model”.  
13 Note that standard learning studies may stress the possibilities of different outcomes of learning processes, 
although it is difficult to view them as generalized economic equilibria.  
14 See Guesnerie‐Jara‐Moroni (2011) for the characterization in models with strategic complementarities or 
substitutabilities 
15 See also Kirman (2010) for alternative lines of reconsideration of standard theory.  
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- First, one has to disentangle the difficulties of predicting, on the one hand, exogenous or 
“intrinsic” uncertainty - the states of the world, which are not affected by actions- and on the 
other hand, strategic (or “extrinsic”) uncertainty, i.e the agents’ actions. These two problems 
are not similar, although they may be connected. Note that in the basic models I have 
sketched in the previous section, there is no “intrinsic” uncertainty. The focus is on the 
difficulty of predicting the other individuals’ actions, a problem that the REH axiomatically 
resolves. Note also that it has been argued convincingly that in our economies, a number of 
basic “structural” parameters are changing in a way which is not correctly assessed by the 
agents.  The consequent absence of “stationarity” in the data raises legitimate but different 
concerns on the difficulties of coordination. Naturally, the two difficulties may interact : if it 
is difficult to predict the others’ beliefs about changing “intrinsic” uncertainty, it will be 
difficult to predict their actions, even if predicting their actions conditional on beliefs is 
possible, which may or may not be the case.      
- Second, the risk for theory is not emptiness but overflow. Once mis-coordination (in the 
sense of the existence in the economy of a variety of views of the future) of expectations is 
allowed, one is forced to recognize that there are myriads of ways for this to happen. The 
theory must face the challenge of assessing such a variety, while putting plausible limits on 
this variety (if not, it would not have any predictive power).  
- This brings me to the third point: the theory under consideration must face the challenge of 
being, in some sense, “a relevant economic theory”. This expression has different meanings, 
one of them being that if the theory becomes known by its actors, and if the situation is 
sufficiently reproducible, it should remain true, when reproduced. Many possible stories on 
the working of the stock markets, which involve for example competition between learning 
schemes, cannot fit such a requirement; if the story convincingly shows that one of the 
learning schemes is superior, then why would the others be still competing in the future? 
Naturally, this question makes sense only if the future looks enough like the past. The 
question of the degree of similarities of situations is clearly behind the scene16.  
- The fourth point is that there are many fascinating normative questions behind the 
reconstruction of an alternative viable theory. For example, the REH leads to view the 
market’s coordination of expectations as “good”, good in the sense of being unbiased, but 
good also to some extent from the social welfare viewpoint17. Outside the REH territory, the 
question of the possible role of government for improving the coordination of expectations 
comes back on the scene18. In any case, the question raised in the third part of this paper, i.e 
 
16 I have discussed this problem (Guesnerie (2000), in my inaugural lecture at Collège de France. In a very 
different way, the “black swan” argument (Taleb (2007), raises the question of the recurrence of rare situations. 
17 Although, in the absence of completeness what is “socially good” is not always crystal-clear.  
18 Although I do not claim that there is an obvious answer: there may be a Hayekian line of argument claiming 
that the government cannot improve on market coordination even when it is bad. Market failures may go with a 
government failure. Note however that P. Massé’s views of the merits of French planning stressed almost 
uniquely its expectational coordination virtues. (“une ètude de marché généralisée”, Massé (1978)) 
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the question of the effect of policies on the quality of expectational coordination will remain 
unavoidable and more difficult to resolve.    
In the background of all this, lies the question of the philosophical determinism which has 
shaped the development of natural sciences but also of economics as a social science.  Let me 
suggest, in order to conclude, that our knowledge, to be more relevant may have to become 
more modest19.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19  And may be closer to the standards that some sociologists assign to their field. 
(Passeron(1991)).    
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